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[L.A. No. 22761. In Bank. Jan. 24, 1957.] 
THE SANTA BARBARA COUNTY WATER AGENCY, 
Respondent, v. A.LL PERSONS AND PARTIES etc., 
Defendants; MAURICE A. BALAAM et aL, Appellants. 
[1] Waters-County Water Agencies-Confirmation and Valida-
tion Proceedings.-A proceeding by a county water agency to 
secure a judicial determination of the legality of the establish-
ment of such agency and its member units and the validity 
of a master contract between the agency and the United States 
and member unit contracts entered into between the agency 
and city and county water districts is a special proceeding 
in rem brought against all persons having or claiming to have 
any interest in the formation of the agency, in the proceedings 
of the various contracting entities leading to execution of the 
contracts, in the operation of such contracts and in the prop-
erty affected thereby, and final judgment forecloses further 
inquiry into the matters to which the judgment properly 
relates, and within its legitimate issues is binding on the world 
at large. 
[2] !d.-County Water Agencies-Contracts-Property and Water 
Rights.-Under a contract between a county water agency 
and the United States for a water supply system to be 
constructed, operated, and maintained by the Bureau of Recla-
mation, the relationship between the parties was that of debtor 
and creditor, contemplating a state project to be eventually 
owned and operated locally, and the domestic water appropri-
ated for beneficial use must be devoted to a use consistent with 
the purpose of the appropriation and the trust relationship 
existing between the United States and the water users 
entitled to service within the agency. 
[3] State of California-Fiscal Matters-Limitations on Disposal 
-Gift of Public Funds.-Generally, a contribution from one 
public agency to another for a purely local purpose of the 
donee agency is in violation of Const., art. IV, § 31, prohibiting 
a gift of public funds, but such a contribution is legal if it 
serves the public purpose of the donor agency though it is 
beneficial to local purposes of the donee agency. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., State of California, § 23. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 14-17] Waters,§ 594.5; 
[3] State of California, § 33; [ 4] Waters, § 1; [7] Taxation, § 21; 
[10] Municipal Corporations, § 98; [12, 13] Improvements-Public, 
§ 23. 
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[4] Waters~Public Policy Regarding Use of Water. Cun:;ervation 
and beneficial use of domestic of the statn serve a 
public purpo8P. art. :X!V, ~ ct) 
[5] !d.-County Water Agencies-Validity of Statute.--The legis-
lative determination that those of a statute (Santa 
Barbara County Water Agency Stats. 1945, p. 2780) 
whereby a county water agency could funds in assist-
ance of member units in furtherance of the purposes 
served by the statute is entitled to a strong presumption of 
cons ti tu tionali ty. 
[6] !d.-County \Vater Agencies.-The financial assistance of a 
county water agency in making an overall plan feasible to 
member units is a proper means of effecting the public purpose 
for the general good of the whole area served the agency. 
[7] Taxation-Delegation of Taxing Power.-The limitations of 
Const., art. XI, § 12, do not prevent the Legislature from 
authorizing a district to impose taxes for a state purpose or 
for a purpose that transcends the boundaries of the various 
municipalities that may be included within the limits of a 
larger district. 
[8] Waters-County Water Agencies-Validity of Statute.-
Const., art. XI, § 12, does not invalidate the power given a 
county water agency by the statute creating it by levying· a 
special tax solely within the defaulting nwmber unit to cure 
the defaulted obligation owing the agency, since a larger 
district, in assessing benefits, can establish zones for that 
purpose in different portions of the district, and since the levy 
prescribed is a protection for the county water agency, is not 
local as to the member units but transcends their boundaries, 
and does not violate the "municipal purpose" clause of the 
constitutional provision. 
[9] !d.-County Water Agencies-Validity of Statute.-The Santa 
Barbara County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1945, p. 2780, as 
amended by Stats. 1949, p. 18) docs not violate Const., art. 
XI, § 6, declaring that corporations for municipal purposes 
shall not be created by special laws, since the term ''municipal 
purposes" has referencP 1 o the purposes of "cities and 
towns." 
[10] Municipal Corporations-General Powers-Extraterritorial 
Powers.-Gencrally, where the scopr; of a project transcends 
the boundaries of a municipality it ceases to be for a municipal 
purpose. 
[11] Waters-County Water Agencies-Assessments-Benefits.-
Where a county water agency was created by special act of 
the Legislature wherein it was determined what lands were to 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 33; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 147. 
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be assessed for the benefit of the public improvement, the 
owners were not entitled to a hearing on the question 
of benefits to the land included within the district since they 
are conclusively presumed to have been heard through their 
in the Legislature, but such a determination 
cannot be or without factual basis. 
Improvements-Public-Apportionment of Burden.-'l'he fix-
ing of the district which is to bear the expense of a local 
and the mode in which such expense is to be 
borne and distributed, are primarily legislative questions. 
[13] !d.-Apportionment of Burden.-The Legislature may apply 
the ad valorem method of assessment in a local improvement 
district without any judicial inquiry into or determination of 
the extent of the benefits. 
[14] Waters-County Water Agencies-Apportionment of Burden. 
-The inclusion of all lands within its boundaries in a county 
water agency and the imposition of an ad valorem tax on such 
lands on the ground that they would benefit by the agency's 
operation was a matter properly determined by the Legislature. 
[15] !d.-County Water Agencies-Validity of Statute.-The pur-
poses of "controlling and conserving storm, flood and other 
surface waters for any benet1cial use and for the protection 
of life and property" in the entire district are within the legiti-
mate scope of a statute creating a county water agency. 
[16] !d.-County Water Agencies-Property and Water Rights.-
Excess land provisions in contracts between a county water 
agency and the Uniterl States for a supply of water to such 
agency are inapplicable and, if not declared to be so, would 
deprive landowners of the member units of their property 
rights without due process of law and constitute a denial of 
equal protection of the laws; the United States is acting 
in its proprietary capacity as a purveyor of domestic waters 
of the state to the agency and its member units, and is bound 
to observe and comply with state laws with reference to the 
rights of water users being served; and the contract is 
innllid insofar as it provides, by implication or otherwise, 
that the United States can arbitrarily cause to he discontinued 
the distribution of water to those for whose bPnefit the right 
to the water was acquired in the first instance. 
[17] !d.-County Water Agencies-Confirmation and Validation 
Proceedings-AppeaL-In a proceeding by a county water 
agency to secure a judicial determination of the legality of 
the establishment of such agency and its HH,mber units and the 
validity of a mastr;r contract between the agency and the 
United States and membel' unit eontracts entered into by 
the agency with a city and county water districts, an appeal 
from a judgment for the agency confirming the validity of 
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such contracts may properly be taken by the objecting de-
fendants within some 35 days after entry of the judgment, 
though the statute creating such agency provides that any 
"party may appeal at any time within 30 days after the 
entry of the judgment," since the intent of the "permissive" 
appeal provisions of such statute are doubtful, and there is no 
reason why the appeal should not be entertained within the 
60-day period prescribed by Rules on Appeal, rule 2 (a). 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Barbara County. Charles F. Blackstock, Judge.* Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part. 
Proceeding by a county water agency to secure a judicial 
determination of the legality of the establishment of such 
agency and its member units and the validity of a master 
contract between the agency and the United States and mem-
ber unit contracts entered into between the agency and cer-
tain public bodies. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed insofar 
as it declared validity of existence of agency and member 
units, and reversed insofar as judgment declared validity of 
contracts. 
Sherman Anderson and W. P. Butcher for Appellants. 
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Herman Phleger, Alvin J. 
Rockwell and John M. Na:ff, Jr., as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Appellants. 
Vern B. Thomas, District Attorney (Santa Barbara), and 
Lawrence M. Parma, Deputy District Attorney, for Re-
spondent. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, B. Abbott Goldberg 
and Adolphus Moskovitz, Deputy Attorneys General, J. Lee 
Rankin, Solicitor General of the Fnited States, Perry W. 
Morton, Assistant Attorney General, David R. Warner and 
Roger P. Marquis, Attornc>ys, Departnwnt of ,Justice,t and 
Price, Postel & Parma as Amici Curiae on behalf of Re-
spondent. 
*Assigned by Chainnan of Judicial Council. 
tReporter's Note: The recmd on appeal docs not show that any attor-
neys for the federal government participated in thP trial court proceed-
ings, and the named counsel filed no hric>fs on appeal and did not other-
wise participate except that they filed a mPmonmdum as Amici Curine 
in support of the petition for a rehearing. 
,Jan. 19371 SANTA BARBARA ETC. AGENCY v. Ar~L PERSONS 703 
[ 47 C.2d 699; 306 P.2d 8731 
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment for the 
plaintiff Santa Barbara County \Vater Agency confirming the 
validity of a so-called ''Master Contract'' between the agency 
and the United States, acting by and through the Bureau 
of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior, and five 
so-called "Member Unit Contracts" between the plaintiff and 
each of five public bodies, namely, the city of Santa Barbara, 
and the Carpinteria, Summerland, Montecito and Goleta 
County Water Districts. 
The plaintiff as petitioner commenced this proceeding on 
February 8, 1950, pursuant to section 11.10 of Santa Barbara 
County Water Agency Act (Act 7303, Stats. 1945, p. 2780; 
amended by Stats. 1949, p. 18) to secure a judicial determina-
tion of the legality of the establishment of the agency and 
its member units, and the validity of the master contract 
and the five-member unit contracts entered into by the agency. 
Such a determination is required by article 35 of the master 
contract, by articles 36 of each of the member unit contracts, 
and by federal law (Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, § 46, 44 
Stats, 649,650,43 U.S.C. §423e). [1] It is a special pro-
ceeding in rem and summons was by publication. It was 
brought against all persons having or claiming to have any 
interest in the formation of the agency, in the proceedings 
of the various contracting entities leading to the execution of 
the contracts, in the operation of the proposed contracts and 
in the property affected thereby. A final judgment will fore-
close further inquiry into the matters to which the judgment 
properly relates, and within its legitimate issues it will be 
binding on the world at large. (Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All 
Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 824], and cases there cited.) 
The answering defendants are Maurice A. Balaam, Ted R. 
Holden, William G. Sudden, W. G. Moore, R. E. Sudden, 
Charles E. Sudden and L. H. Crandall. The default of all 
other defendants was duly entered on May 1, 1950. 
The petition alleged six causes of action each seeking the 
confirmation of one of the contracts involved. The defend-
ants demurred to each count on both general and special 
grounds. The demurrers were overruled. The defendants' 
answer denied the validity of the formation of the plaintiff 
agency, certain proceedings of the board of directors of the 
agency leading to and including the signing of the master 
contract, the master contract itself, the proceedings of the 
respective boards of directors of the different member units 
leading to and including the signing of the respective member 
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unit contrads alHl the the ~member unit 
contracts. 
'l'he defendants also pleaded nine affirmative defenses to 
each of the causes of action. In substance it is alleged: (1) 
that provisions in the member unit contracts authorized by 
the Santa Barbara County "\Yater Agency Act, whereby the 
agency will levy ad valorem taxes on all property in the agency 
to establish a fund from which contributions will be made 
to the member units, violate the constitutional provisions 
against legislative gifts and authorization of the imposition of 
local taxes by special legislation (art. IV, § 13 and art. XI, 
§ 12 of the state Constitution) ; (2) that the Santa Barbara 
Water Agency Act purports to give the agency the power to 
levy ad valorem taxes on all property in the city of Santa 
Barbara and the various county water districts in violation 
of the constitutional prohibition of the imposition of taxes on 
individuals or property within public corporations for munici-
pal purposes (art. XI, § 12 of the state Constitution); (3) 
that the Santa Barbara Water Agency Act is unconstitutional 
in that it subjects the defendants to taxation and assessment 
on lands which cannot possibly be benefited from the con-
struction of the project; ( 4) that any determination, legisla-
tive or otherwise, that the defendants' lands will be benefited 
by the project is arbitrary and contrary to any rational view 
based on evidence of investigation; (5) that the contracts pro-
vide for no distribution of water to parcels owned by a single 
person in excess of 160 acres, but that the excess lands are 
nevertheless subject to taxation for project purposes; (6) 
that the contracts are impossible of performance and lacking 
in consideration; (7) that the contracts (except the city of 
Santa Barbara Member Unit Contract) purport to prohibit 
the exclusion from the district of lands not benefited by the 
project, without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior; 
that section 23202 of the "\Yater Code condones such provisions, 
and that both the contracts and section 23202 violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution and con-
stitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power under the 
state Constitution (art. IV, § 1); (8) that the provisions of 
section 9 (c) (2) and (e) of the Reclamation Project Act 
of 1939 (53 Stats. 1187, 43 U.S.C., § 485), pursuant to which 
the contracts purport to have been executed, constitute an 
unconstitutional delegation of power to the Secretary of the 
Interior, and (9) that those provisions of the contracts which 
provide that the United States is entitled to all waste, seepage, 
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and return flow \Yater derived from water supplied under the 
contracts to the member units through the agency, are invalid 
under the federal reclamation laws and the law of the state 
which make such waters appurtenant to the lands irrigated. 
The agency demurred generally to each of the affirmative 
defenses and the demurrers were sustained. 
The causes >vere tried on November 14, 1951, and a judg-
ment was entered on October 22, 1952. The judgment declared 
(a) the legality of the organization and existence of the 
agency, the city of Santa Barbara and the four county water 
districts, (b) the due execution of the six contracts, (c) the 
lawfulness of the contracts, and (d) that the defendants had 
waived and were estopped from asserting the illegality or 
unconstitutionality of the agency and of the Santa Barbara 
County Agency Act. The defendants have appealed from all 
portions of the judgment. The Attorney General of the State 
of California has appeared as amicus curiae in support of 
the judgment, and the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation has 
appeared as amicus curiae asserting the invalidity of the 
contract. 
The county of Santa Barbara is situated in a semiarid 
portion of Southern California. It has no common source of 
water supply that can serve the entire county but contains 
numerous noncontiguous watersheds. The county has grown 
greatly in population and developed an economy requiring 
full utilization and development of all available water sup-
plies. For many years the county made investigations and 
engineering surveys of its water resources utilizing private, 
public and United States engineers for that purpose. Pur-
suant thereto, in June, 1945, a comprehensive water develop-
ment plan for the county was submitted by the Bureau of 
Reclamation, and the Santa Barbara County Water Agency 
was formed by the Legislature in 1945 to carry out the plan. 
The agency's boundaries are coextensive with those of the 
county and the lands served by all member units lie within 
its boundaries. 
Commencing in 1946 the agency began negotiations for a 
water supply from the Cachuma Unit of the Santa Barbara 
County Project, described in House Document Number 587 
of the 80th Congress, 2d Session of April 1, 1948. That 
document reveals that the Cachuma Unit will consist of the 
Cachuma Dam and Reservoir on the Santa Ynez River, the 
Tecelote Transmountain Diversion Tunnel and the South Coast 
47 C.2d-23 
[47 C.2d 
""""'>r<>,fi and maintained 
to federal reclamation 
that the water to be diverted for purposes of the 
is unappropriated water to be appropriated under 
state law, and that the estimated cost of construction of 
the Cachuma Unit, exclusive of distribution works, 
is $28,610,000. This amount is to be reimbursed to the United 
States by for water in excess of the costs of upkeep, 
operation and maintenance over a period calculated not to 
exceed 50 years. [2] It is apparent that what we have said 
in Ivanhoe Ir1·. Dist. v. AU Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 
824], is equally true in the present case, namely, that the 
relationship between the parties is that of debtor and creditor, 
contemplating a state project to be eventually owned and oper-
ated locally, and that the domestic water herein appropriated 
for beneficial use must be and can only be devoted to a use 
consistent with the purpose of the appropriation and the trust 
relationship existing between the United States and the water 
users entitled to service within the agency. 
The contracts in question are for the furnishing of domestic 
water by a purveyor thereof at a stipulated price. They do 
not involve the construction of distribution systems, as in 
the Ivanhoe and Madera cases. (Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All 
Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 824]; M.adcra Irr. Dist. v. 
A.ll Persons, ante, p. 681 [306 P.2d 886] .) The master 
contract contemplates a supply of water for irrigation, munici-
pal, domestic, industrial and other uses to be furnished and 
delivered to each member unit of the agency for a period of 
40 years, specifying delivery points, time of delivery and 
maximum rates for various classes of water. The agency is 
charged with the payments for all water delivered to member 
units. Provisions other than those specifically objected to 
by the defendants in their affirmative defenses provide for 
the storage of water, availability of excess water, responsibility 
for water shortage, the recognition by the bureau of existing 
water rights, transfers of water by member units, defaults 
in payments, inspection of books and records by the bureau 
and other provisions not here material. 
The member unit contracts, identical in form, are in general 
repetitions of the master contract except as to the contracting 
parties and the changes made necessary by the substitution 
thereof. Payments for water to be delivered are to be made 
by member units to the agency. Those features of the 
master contract which are objected to are contained also in 
each of the member unit contracts. 
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relates to the of the Santa 
Act and the existence of the contract-
ing entities. The contracts that the agency and the 
member units initiate legal nl'(\"''Ni which seek not only 
the confirmation of the contracts but also 
of the of the of the 
member units. 
in their first affirmative defense that the act violates section 
31 of article IV of the Constitution, which prohibits legisla-
tive authorization for the donation of funds. Section 
10.2 of the act provides in part that the agency shall have 
the power to exprnd any or all of thr funds or contributions 
in aid of: (a) the construction or payment of the eost of 
works; (b) the purchase or obtaining of '\Vater or a water 
supply; and (c) the payment of any liability "assumed 
as principal, guarantor, or underwriter on an indebtedness 
in connection ·with such construction, payment, purchase or 
obtaining; if such works are constructed or said water or 
water supply is obtained for or on behalf of the agency or 
its member units .... " In accordance with the above and 
other provisions of the act (see § 5.1) the agency has agreed 
in its contracts to pay for >Yater furnished to member units 
to the extent of $100,000 annually, prorated among the mem-
ber units in accordance with their respective annual payments 
to the agency. This, it is contended, constitutes a gift of 
public funds and a violation of section 31, article IV. 
[3] It is the general rule that a contribution from one 
public agency to another for a purely local purpose of the 
donee agency is in violation of the constitutional prohibition, 
hut that such a contribution is legal if it serves the publie 
purpose of the donor agency even though it is beneficial to 
local purposes of the donee agency. (Pacific JJiutual Life 
Ins. Co. v. County of Ban Diego, 112 CaL 314 [41 P. 423, 
44 P. 571] .) Thus in City of Oakland v. Garrison, 194 Cal. 
298 [228 P. 433], payment by the county of Alameda to the 
city of Oakland to improve a street entirely within the city 
was held to be proper where the county board of supervisors 
found it 'ivould he for the general good of the county. And 
in County of Los Angeles v. Riley, 6 Cal.2d 625 [59 P.2d 
139, 106 A.I1.R. 903], it was held that the state could impose 
a statewide tax on motor vehicles and then apportion some 
of the proeeeds to the couuti(•s for local use because a statewise 
public purpose was being served. ''The determination of what 
constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for legis-
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lative discretion [citations] which is not disturbed by the 
courts so long as it has a reasonable basis [citations]. This 
court has frequently upheld the expenditure of funds by the 
state or by its subdivisions for the benefit of individuals as 
for a 'public purpose' and hence not within section 31 of 
Article IV." (County of Alameda v. Janssen, 16 Cal.2d 276 
at 281 [106 P.2d 11, 130 A.L.R. 1141]; see also County of Los 
Angeles v. La Fttente, 20 Cal.2d 870, 876 [129 P.2d 378] ; 
Caliform:a Emp. Stab. Com. v. Payne, 31 Cal.2d 210, 216 
[187 P.2d 702] .) 
[4] That the conservation and beneficial use of the domes-
tic waters of this state serve a public purpose is without 
question. ( Const., art. XIV, § 3.) [5] The legislative de-
termination that those provisions of the act whereby the 
agency could expend funds in assistance to member units 
in furtherance of the public purposes served by the act is 
entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality and 
nothing appears herein to dispel that presumption. [6] The 
financial assistance of the agency in making the overall plan 
economically feasible to the member units is a proper means 
of effecting the public purpose for the general good of the 
whole of the area served by the agency. 
It is next contended by the defendants in both their first 
and second affirmative defenses that the act creating the 
agency is in violation of article XI, section 12 of the Con-
stitution, which forbids the Legislature to levy taxes on public 
corporations, or upon the property thereof, "for county, city, 
town, or other municipal purposes but may, by general laws, 
vest in the corporate authorities thereof the power to assess 
and collect taxes for such purposes. . . . '' 
[7] The limitations of section 12 do not prevent the Leg-
islature from authorizing a district to impose taxes for a state 
purpose (Joint Highway Dist. No. 18 v. Hinman, 220 Cal. 
578, 588 [32 P. 144]), nor for a purpose that transcends the 
boundaries of the various municipalities that may be included 
within the limits of a larger district (Henshaw v. Foster, 176 
Cal. 507, 511 [169 P. 82]; Pixley v. Saunders, 168 Cal. 152 
[ 141 P. 815].) In view of the declaration of section 3, article 
XIV of the Constitution, that "because of conditions prevail-
ing in this State the general welfare requires that the water 
resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest 
extent of whieh they are capable, and that the waste or 
unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be 
prevented, and that the conservation of such water is to be 
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exercised with to the reasonable and beneficial use 
thereof in the interest of the people and for the public wel-
fare ... , " it is contended by the agency that it serves more 
than a "county, city, town or other municipal purpose" with-
in the meaning of section 12, and that the constitutional 
prohibition is therefore inapplicable in the present situation. 
This contention has support in the legislative and decisional 
law of the state. In spite of numerous enactments for the 
conservation of water wherein the power to levy taxes and 
assessments was conferred on an agency of the state, and in 
numerous cases where the constitutionality of such enactments 
was questioned on various grounds, no case is referred to or 
has been found wherein a specially created district with taxing 
powers similar in scope to those of the present agency has 
been held to be unconstitutional by reason of section 12. 
(Cf. Municipal Home Rnle in California, John C. Peppin, 34 
Cal.L.Rev. 644.) 
[8] It is also contended that section 12 of article XI 
invalidates the power given the agency by section 10.3 of the 
act by levying a special tax solely within the defaulting mem-
ber unit to cure the defaulted financial obligation owing the 
agency. But a larger district, in assessing benefits, can estab-
lish zones for that purpose in different portions of the district. 
(See Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Hamilton, 
177 Cal. 119, at 128 [169 P. 1028] .) The levy prescribed 
by section 10.3 of the act is a protection for the agency, is not 
local as to the member units but transcends their boundaries 
and does not violate the "municipal purpose" clause of 
section 12 of article XI. (Pixley v. Saunders, sttpra, 168 Cal. 
152; Pasadena v. Chamberlain, 204 Cal. 653 [269 P. 630]; 
County of Los Angeles v. Httnt, 198 Cal. 753 [247 P. 897] .) 
It is also contended, although not specifically set out in any 
of the affirmative defenses, that the special enactment of the 
Santa Barbara County Water Agency Act is in violation of 
section 6, article XI of the Constitution, which provides in 
part: ''Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be 
created by special laws; but, the Legislature shall, by general 
laws, provide for the incorporation, organization and classifi-
cation, in proportion to population, of cities and towns .... " 
The question is whether the agency has been created for 
"municipal purposes" within the meaning of the above 
section. 
[9] It would appear from a reading of the section that 
the term ''municipal purposes'' has reference to the purposes 
710 v. ALL PERRO~S 
by 
the court in [198 
P. 1060, 17 A.L.R court had before it the 
uuoauJtu;;, of '' '' as employed in section 
1 of article XIII of the Constitution. In defining that expres-
sion as not to include an district the court referred 
to section 6, article and stated at page 188 ''At the 
same election article XI, section 6, was amended by the people. 
This section restricts the power of the legislature in the 
formation of municipal corporations, to providing by general 
law for their formation, and prohibits the formation of such 
corporation by special statute. That section uses the term 
'municipal corporation' as synonymous with 'cities and 
towns.''' (See also Lagttna Beach Gmvnty ·water Dist. v. 
Orange County, 30 Cal..App.2d 740, 743 [87 P.2d 46]; People 
v. Rinner, 62 Cal..App. 747, 751 [199 P. 1066].) 
[10] Generally it is true that where the scope of a project 
transcends the boundaries of a municipality it ceases to be 
for a municipal purpose. (See Pixley v. Saunders, sttpra, 
168 Cal. 152; Cmmty of Los Lingeles v. IIunt, supra, 198 Cal. 
753; Ga.dd v. McGtti1·e, 69 Cal..App. 347 [231 P. 754].) In 
Pasadena v. Chamberlain, S1tpra, 204 Cal. 653, involving the 
constitutionality of the Metropolitan Water District .Act with 
respect to article XI, section 6, this court held that in the 
combined operations of several municipalities under the act, 
''the municipalities engaged therein could not be held to be 
engaged in the conduct of a merely municipal affair.'' .A 
similar conclusion was reached in Van de Water v. Pridham. 
33 Cal..App. 252, 259 [164 P. 1136], relative to drainag~ 
ditches constructed partly within a city under the Drainage 
Act of 1903; and in Pasadena Park Imp. Go. v. Lelande, 175 
Cal. 511 [166 P. 341], relating to a protection district (Stats. 
1895, p. 248) to protect against floods and including city lands. 
Numerous cases have established that special legislation in 
the creation of various types of districts dealing with water 
problems is not in contravention of the "municipal purpose" 
clause of section 6 of article XI. (People v. Levee Dist. No.6, 
131 Cal. 30 [63 P. 676] [levee district]; People v. Sacramento 
Drainage Dist., 155 Cal. 373 [103 P. 207] [drainage district]; 
Redamation District No. 70 v. Shennan, 11 Cal..App. 399 [105 
P. 277], and Peterson v. Board of Supervisors, 65 Cal..App. 670 
l225 P. 28] [reclamation districts] ; Barber v. Galloway, 195 
Cal. 1, 13 [231 P. 34] [combined irrigation, drainage and 
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water distribution Palo Verde Dis-
.) 
It is noted that the cases have made distinetions between 
the meaning to be to the terms ' '' 
or ''municipal purposes,'' upon the 
tion of the Constitution to which the definition relates. 
dissenting Chief Justice Beatty of San 
111ateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, at page 637 P. 78, 621].) 
It is concluded that the agency is not a purely 
municipal function within the meaning of section 6 of article 
XI and the decisional law thereon. 
The invalidity of the act is also urged the defendants in 
their third and fourth afiirmative defenses on the ground, 
generally, that the only lands receiving benefits thereunder 
are those within the member units; that considerable portions 
of land within the boundaries of the agency are not within 
any member unit and therefore are not benefited by the 
act, and that the levy of an ad valorem tax on all lands within 
the agency authorized by the act is a taking of property with-
out due process of law. This contention has often been liti-
gated under similar circumstances. The basis question relates 
to a proper finding of a benefit conferred on lands not directly 
served. [11] In the present case the agency was created by 
a special act of the Legislature wherein it was determined 
what lands were to be assessed for the benefit of the public 
improvement. In such circumstances "the property owners 
are not entitled to a hearing on the question of benefits to 
the land included within the district for they are conclusively 
presumed to have been heard through their representatives in 
the legislature." (Orosi Public Utility Dz:st., In re, 196 Cal. 
43, 50 [235 P. 1004] .) Such a determination, however, cannot 
be arbitrary, capricious or without factual basis. 
[12] The basis of proper legislative determination of bene-
fits conferred on all lands within a district is dealt with ex-
haustively in Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. 
II amilton, supra, 177 Cal. 119, and that case is determinative 
of the contentions in the present case. There claims of lack 
of direct benefit of all lands within the district were the 
same for all material purposes as those urged by the defend-
ants in their third and fourth affirmative defenses. Beginning 
at page 123 this eourt stated: '"fhe warrant and justification 
for charging the cost of such improvement upon designated 
lands is to be found, in theory at least, in the benefit to be 
derived by the lands assessed from the contemplated work. 
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(Reclamat-ion Dist. v. Birks, 159 Cal. 233, 241 [113 P. 170].) 
... The fixing of the district which is to bear the expense of a 
local improvement, and the mode in which such expense is 
to be borne and distributed, are primarily legislative questions. 
. . . But since the imposition of such costs finds its ground 
of sanction in the benefits conferred upon the lands charged, 
it may well be that the legislative conclusion should not be 
upheld where the court can see that it is contrary to any 
rational view of the facts, and that lands have been included 
that 'plainly could not by any fair or proper view of the facts 
be benefited.' . . . '' The court proceeded to examine the 
facts, noting that the district contained "several separate and 
unconnected watersheds''; that it ''comprised a considerable 
area of mountainous land"; that much of the district lay 
"above the plane of any flood waters which are to be antici-
pated,'' and that other lands were beyond the area of possible 
floods. Conceding that such lands could not be directly bene-
fited, the court held that "the benefit which would justify the 
inclusion of land within the district need not be so direct and 
immediate as is assumed in the argument of counsel opposing 
the validity of the act.'' In referring to numerous cases 
involving problems closely related to the present one, the court 
concluded that an "examination of these cases will show that 
the courts have regarded an incidental or indirect benefit as 
sufficient to justify the imposition of a part of the burden of 
the improvement. Such indirect benefit may result from the 
improvement of neighboring and surrounding land, and the 
consequent increase in the value of all land within the district. 
. . . The proper maintenance of the harbors by protecting 
them from flood damage, the preservation of the means of 
communication between the different parts of the district by 
guarding against damage to highways and bridges . . . these 
are purposes whose execution may well be of substantial and 
immediate benefit to all of the lands included within the dis-
trict." [13] As to the imposition of an ad valorem tax, the 
court had this to say, beginning at page 124: "It is thor-
oughly settled that the legislature may apply the ad valorem 
method of assessment, without any judicial inquiry into, or 
determination of, the extent of benefits. Recognizing that 
absolute equality cannot be attained under any system of 
taxation or assessment, the courts hold that constitutional 
requirements are satisfied by that approximation to equality 
which may fairly be thought to result from an assessment of 
the cost upon the property benefited in proportion to its 
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ascertained value. (Burnett v. Mayor, etc. Sacramento, 
12 Cal. 76, 84 [73 Am.Dec. 518] ; In re Madem Irr. Dist., 92 
Cal. 296 [27 Am.St.Rep. 106, 14 L.RA. 755, 28 P. 272, 675]; 
'l'homas v. Pridharn, 171 Cal. 98, 104 [153 P. 933] ; Fallbrook 
Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, supra [164 U.S. 112 (17 S.Ct. 56, 41 
L.Ed. 369)].)" 
[14] From the foregoing it is apparent that the inclusion 
of all of the lands within the agency and the imposition 
of an ad valorem tax on all of these lands on the ground 
that they would benefit by the operation thereof was a matter 
properly determined by the Legislature. [15] It is noted 
that among the purposes for which the agency was created 
are ''controlling and conserving storm, flood and other surface 
waters for any beneficial use and for the protection of life 
and property in said district." ( Stats. 1945, p. 2780.) Those 
indirect benefits referred to in Los Angeles Flood Control 
District v. Hamilton, supra, and conferred upon all of the 
lands within the agency, appear to be well within the legiti-
mate scope of the act. 
[16] In their fifth affirmative defense the defendants raise 
issues which have been discussed and disposed of in Ivanhoe 
Irr. Dist. v . .c1Zl Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 824], and 
in Madera In·. Dist. v. All Persons, ante, p. 681 [306 P.2d 
886]. In accordance therewith it is concluded that the excess 
land provisions of the contracts involved here, which are 
substantially the same as those in the Ivanhoe and Madera 
contracts, are inapplicable and if not declared to be so would 
deprive the landowners of the member units of their property 
rights without due process of law and constitute a denial of 
the equal protection of the la>vs; that the United States is 
acting in its proprietary capacity as a purveyor of the domes-
tic waters of the state to the agency and its member units; 
that it is bound to observe and comply with the laws of the 
state with reference to the rights of the water users being 
served, and that the contract is invalid insofar as it, by implica-
tion or otherwise, provides that the United States can arbitrar-
ily cause to be discontinued the distribution of water to those 
for whose benefit the right to the water was acquired in the 
first instance. 
Numerous other grounds for the invalidity of the contracts 
are asserted. It is stated in the defendants' sixth affirmative 
defense that the contracts are lacking in consideration and 
are impossible of performance, in their seventh and eighth 
affirmative defenses that provisions in the contracts author-
( § f:j 
power to the of the Interior 
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution and pro-
visions in the state Constitution IV, § and in the ninth 
affirmative defense that the the United 
States to all seepage and return flow are invalid. 'l'hese 
contentions are when considered with 
what has been said herein Ivanhoe and Madera 
cases as to the matters which the may 
properly contract. 
Questions have been raised as to the of certain 
proceedings leading to the execution of the contracts and the 
notice of elections for their confirmation. Such questions need 
not be determined in this case for the reason that upon a 
submission of any further proposed contracts the alleged 
defects need not recur. 
The attorney general appearing as amicus curiae in behalf 
of the State of California in support of the judgment, ques-
tions the right of the appellants to prosecute this appeal. It 
appears that the notice of appeal was filed some 35 days after 
entry of the judgment. Section 11.10 of the Santa Barbara 
County ·water Agency Act provides in part that any "party 
may appeal at any time within 30 days after the entry of the 
judgment." It is contended that the failure to appeal within 
the time specified requires that the appeal be dismissed by 
the court of its O'Nn motion, even if no objection has been 
made by any party to the proceeding. (In re Horowitz, 33 
Cal.2d 534, 537 [203 P.2d 513] ; Estate of Hanley, 23 Cal.2d 
120, 123 [142 P.2d 423, 149 A.L.R. 1250] .) 
[17] The appellants assert that the 30-day period within 
which an appeal "may" be taken in pursuance of section 
11.10 of the act is permissive and not mandatory. Section 
2 ( i) of the act provides that "may" is permissive and "shall" 
is mandatory. Section 11.10 of the act, after setting forth 
the special provision for the time in which to appeal, states 
further that the ''rules of pleading and practice not incon-
sistent with the provisions of this section, are applicable to 
all actions or proceedings provided for by this section.'' Rule 
2 (a) of the Rules on Appeal provide that "Except as other-
wise specifically provided by law, notice of appeal shall be 
filed within 60 days from the date of entry of the judg-
ment .... " 
The appellants contend that as the special provision is 
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' the latter should control. 
declaration in section 11.10 of the act: 
for this the court shall 
does not affect 
the cause will be heard on its merits. 
207 Cal. 452 P. 1025] ; San 
Francisco v. Certain Real Estate, 42 Cal. 513.) In People v. 
Bank San Lnis Obispo, 152 CaL 261, it is said at page 264 
P. 481] : "The right of appeal is remedial and in doubtful 
cases the doubt should be resolved in favor of the right \vhen-
the substantial interests of a are affected a 
judgment.' 
The intent of the so-called "permissive" appeal provisions 
of section 11.10 at best is doubtful and in accordance with 
the foregoing no good reason appears why the appeal should 
not be entertained. 
It is concluded that the judgment insofar as it declares 
the validity of the Santa Barbara ·water Agency Act and the 
existence of the agency and its member units must be and 
hereby is affirmed. Insofar as the judgment confirms and 
declares valid the master contract and the :five member unit 
contracts it is reversed, the appellants to reeover costs on 
appeaL 
Sehanee, J., .J., and McComb, coneurred. 
GIBSON, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I eoncur in 
the views expressed in the portion of the majority opinion 
which relates to the Ya1idity of the Santa Barbara Water 
Agency Act and the existence of the Agency and its member 
units. For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in 
lvanho!? Irr. Dist. v. All Parti!?s, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 
, I with the majority opinion insofar as it 
reverses the judgment of the trial court. 
Traynor, ,J., concurred. 
is a eompanion case to 
ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 
716 HAYWARD IJU::'IIBER & INv. Co. v. BrscArLuz [47 C.2d 
, and for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion 
in that ease, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court 
here. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
19, 1957. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[L.A. No. 24226. In Bank. Jan. 25, 1957.] 
HAYWARD LUMBER AND INVESTMENT COMPANY 
(a Corporation), Appellant, v. E. W. BISCAILUZ et al., 
Respondents. 
[1] Process-Definition.-An order of court purporting to re-
lease an attachment "as to all property except $2,000.00 in 
bank account" comes within the definition of "process" in Gov. 
Code, § 26660, as including all "orders of courts of justice," 
or judicial officers. 
[2] Sheriffs- Liability. -Generally, a sheriff assuming to act 
virtute officii warrants that he is possessed of such authority 
and, if not authorized, is liable to persons who suffer damage 
from steps taken under the belief that he was. 
[3] !d.-Service of Process.-In the service of process the sheriff 
is responsible only for unreasonably or not reasonably execut-
ing it; he must act with reasonable diligence, and reasonable 
diligence depends on the particular facts. 
[4] !d.-Liability-Release of Property.-Where in an attachment 
suit in the superior court defendant's attached bank account 
would have been sufficient to satisfy plaintiff's demand, the 
court ordered a partial release, which order did not contain 
any direction to the sheriff and was not entered in the perma-
nent minutes until a week after its date, the county clerk 4 
days after its entry issued his certifieate reciting that notice 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Process, Notices and Papers, § 1; Arn.Jur., 
Process, § 2. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Sheriffs and Constables, § 17 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Sheriffs, Police and Constables, § 37 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Sheriffs and Constables, § 13; Arn.Jur., Sheriffs, 
Police and Constables, § 46 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Process, ~1; [2] Sheriffs, §15; [3] 
Sheriffs, § 12; [ 4, 10] Sheriffs, § 18; Sheriffs, §§ 1, 12; [ 6] 
Sheriffs, § 16; [7] Records, § 43; [8] Attachment, § 75; [9] At-
tachment, § 55. 
